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CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSHIP. By Louis Prashker.
John's University School of Law, 1933, pp. vii, 526.

Brooklyn: St.

Most of us shy at the "Cases and Materials" publications. They belong on
that shelf where various attempts have been made to reclassify legal topics
according to the average problem presented and where the factual connection is
closest. The shelf is generally the highest in our library and preferably beyond
our reach. There never was any real reason why this modern school of legal
education should take unto itself the exclusive use of the name. The satisfactory "case-book" today must be supplemented with additional "materials". We
note with pleasure, therefore, that in this latest work on the law of partnerships,
the title has an entirely different meaning. To be sure, there is a reclassification, but based on the sound reason that the uniform act has supplanted "much
ancient learning on the law of partnership."
Taking the Partnership Act as his basis, the author has grouped the cases
and materials around its principal chapters. In respect to the cases selected
it is apparent that there are two central ideas: first, to include the opinions
that have been handed down during the last decade and which interpret the
sections of the law and, second, to exclude those cases which have been overruled by reason of the adoption of the statute. The Partnership Act provides
that it "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effect its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it." The author has sensed
this object in selecting the recent cases. He has drawn primarily from those
states that have adopted the statute. Students and lawyers will note to what
degree the object has been attained. The weeding-out process must have been
difficult. To understand what is now "ancient" requires knowledge of what
the law was. The author solves this problem by including the important early
cases in an abbreviated form. The necessary historical background is thus
supplied and the transition is easily effected. The material includes "notes"
used by the Commission on Uniform State Laws in preparing the Partnership
Act. These will be particularly helpful in interpreting those sections not
already passed upon by the courts. The text materials parallel the sections of
the statute and include matters taken from the author's "Outlines on the Law
of Partnerships." The notes contain many references to law-review articles
as well as interesting and original questions based on case analysis.
The author's primary purpose in publishing this volume was for the use of
law students. In this, he has succeeded. What more could be said in justification or praise?
W. TAPLEY.
St. John's University School of Law.

LAW OF TRUSTS.

By Edward J. O'Toole. St. John's University School of Law,

1933, pp. xvii, 121.
The supervision of trusts by courts of equity lends itself easily to scientific
classification. Trusts are either express or implied, and express trusts are
either created by clear language or by necessary inferences from facts and

BOOK REVIEWS
circumstances. Implied trusts arise by operation of law without regard to the
will of the parties and are either in promotion of admitted rights of the parties
or are imposed by way of penaty-ex malificio.
This readily permissible classification, which is not available in most
branches of jurisprudence, makes it possible to treat this subject in the law
school more scientifically than other courses, such as Equity or Property,
where broad classifications are inclusive and overlapping. Full advantage of
this fortuitous circumstance has been taken in this outline, which may therefore
be said to be proof against failing memory.
But aside from the necessity of providing a formal basis for teaching the
elements of the law of trusts to students and for indelibly impressing upon
their minds the established principles which constitute the stuff from which
future decisions are made, this Outline is significantly fruitful in having
presented opportunities for juristic analysis and close examination of the nature
of the judicial process. In the end, law teachers all come to the conclusionthat teaching law means not instructing merely in fixed rules but, rather,
teaching a process. It is now a commonplace that decisions of the couits
depend far more on considerations that are not contained in the case books than
they do upon rule and precedent.
This realization, which was new twenty-five years ago and has pervaded
academic circles only within the last decade, is now, largely as a result of the
vogue of Judge Cardozo's books, the property of all enlightened lawyers. Let
us see how this Outline meets the rigorous test of the new requirements for
law teaching.
In the first place, there are the historical contributions to the modem law
of trusts. I pass over the lucidly stated first chapter which gives an account
of the recognized history of the subject matter, including an account of the
famous controversy between Ames and Holmes. This of itself would be of
small service to the practitioner or the law student, other than to constitute a
sort of intellectual springboard from which to jump into the sea of cases. But
there are special branches of the subject matter which show the impact of
historical forces with great clarity. Thus, our modern division of trusts "into
passive and active trusts adopted by the New York Legislature would be
impossible to understand, were it not for the account of the difficulties encountered by the ancient Statute of Uses. And again, the peculiar New York law
created by statute which attempts to destroy resulting trusts, only to revive
them under the guise of constructive trusts, constitutes a lesson in legal history
which chapters 7 and.8 of this Outline very plainly and clearly teach.
Sociologists of the law will rejoice in the chapter on charitable trusts,
which contains an object lesson in law difficult to match in any other field of
jurisprudence. The manner in which the courts first limited and then destroyed
the doctrine of the Williantr case, and the final culmination of this process
and the popular explosion which resulted from the decision in the Tilden case,
followed by the legislative reaction as set forth in the legislation of 1893,
constitute a unique chapter in the history of the jurisprudence of this state.
But even this legislation has left a doubt as to whether charitable trusts may
completely defy the rule against perpetuities. This reviewer shares the
author's doubts with regard to this matter, but sufficient ground apparently
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exists to afford an object lesson in legislative drafting. Whether the law as
it stands today permits the creation of charitable trusts in perpetuity is the
issue involved, and while this reviewer is of the opinion that such trusts may
be created, it is freely recognized that this is only due to judicial interpretation
of an ambiguously worded statute. The legislature could have restored the
rule in the Williams case in more apt language, and thus removed the difficulties encountered by the Court in the decision of Allen v. Stevens.
The accounts given in the Outline of the well-known equity problems
connected with following the trust res and the liabilities of trustees for the
co-mingling of funds are analytically perfect, giving an original, constructive
and lucid explanation of difficult and contentious principles of equity. Here,
as elsewhere, the author has resorted to simplification and sententious
statement.
The limits of an Outline preclude debate on diverse points of view, and the
author has had to forego the opportunity to criticize opposing views as well
as the opportunity to defend his own position. But his students are acquainted
with the manner in which he goes about these major problems of the law
teacher and the Outline is extremely useful in the classroom, for it affords a
constant background for class discussion and co-ordinates the results arrived
at by judicial decision. No student who knows the contents of this Outline
need fear the most intricate devices of the examiner's skill.
Were there outlines of this character in all courses offered by law schools,
the tasks both of teaching and learning would be infinitely simplified.
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN.

St. John's University School of Law.

THE LAW OF THE PRESS.

By William G. Hale and Ivan Benson.

St. Paul:

West Publishing Co., 1933, pp. 610.
This is the second edition of this book and came from the press last June.
The first edition was published in April, 1923. It is a valuable contribution to
the literature upon the subject of libel, and should prove particularly helpful
to the journalist, for whom it was especially written. The legal practitioner,
as well as the student and the teacher in the law school, will find an abundance
of material in this volume. The treatment of the subject by the authors is
practical. Their purpose to develop a book not only for use as the basis of a
course in the law of the press in schools of journalism, but as a manual for
active journalists, has been accomplished. Professor Benson is Associate Professor of Journalism in the University of Southern California, and a trained
journalist, whose collaboration "has brought about a careful revision and
reorganization of materials with a view to their clarification for the lay reader."
The author of the first edition, and one of the authors of the second edition,
Professor Hale, is Dean of the Law School of Southern California. The preface
to the first edition informs us that the book is the fruitage "of a course of lec-

